Revolutionary Worker #912, June 22, 1997
Over a year ago, the red flag of people's war was raised in Nepal. In February 1996 the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)--a participating party in the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement--opened a new and liberating chapter in the history of that country by launching a protracted people's war. Issue No. 3 of The Worker, published by the CPN(M), contains summations of the first year of the war and other important articles. The following is the second part of one of the articles from that issue. The first part, which appeared in RW #911, gave some background to the struggle in Nepal and analyzed the First Plan of the people's war.
The basic objective of the Second Plan was to develop guerrilla warfare in a planned manner so as to prepare grounds to convert specific areas into Guerrilla Zones in the near future. For this the emphasis would be on creating radicalized (or militarized) mass base in specific areas and upgrading and expanding the fighting capability of the armed detachments. Accordingly, broad categorization and identification of Principal Zones, Secondary Zones and Propaganda Zones were made and the forces and activities were sought to be channelized and centralized in keeping with the envisaged roles of different zones. As earlier a short period of preparation would precede the launching of the Second Plan, and by the very objective and nature of the Plan it would not commence on a fixed date but would follow an approximate time frame.
There was a slight setback in the beginning of the Plan, as the enemy managed to sniff it and the important element of "surprise" had to be partially compromised. However, by October the execution of the Second Plan had started in right earnest, and gradually it unfolded in such a manner and scale that the reactionary camp was again caught in a surprise. A set of military and non-military actions were sought to be judiciously blended from the beginning; and this plus the gradual phasing of the major actions over time and space provided the key to the successful launching and progress of the Second Plan.
Of the major military actions so far, daring guerrilla actions to seize arms have been the most notable ones. Armed guerrilla squads raided police outposts at Lung in Pyuthan on December 14, at Triveni in Dolpa, on December 15 (both in Western Hills) and at Bethan in Ramechhap (Eastern Hills) on January 3 and the state-owned Nepal Bank Ltd. at Durandanda in Lamjung (Central Hills) on November 14. Out of these the Bethan raid was the most successful and was rightly hailed as the best example of daring military exploit and supreme sacrifice so far. Arms of local tyrants were also seized in different districts like Sallyan, Dolakha, etc. Also during this Plan period selected annihilation of local tyrants, police informers and policemen were carried out. Of these the annihilations of a police Sub-Inspector (responsible for killing Comrade Ram Brishya Yadav) in Dhanusa (Eastern Terai), a village committee chairman (responsible for the arrest of Com. Dev Gurung) in Gorkha and several police informers in Rolpa, Rukum and Sindhuli were highly appreciated by the masses and were of immense political significance. Similarly, a large number of sabotage actions including the ones against the Agricultural Development Banks (in Kavre and Baglung), INGOs (in Baglung and Mygdi), premises of comprador capitalists (in Kathmandu and Kapilvastu) and others were carried out all over the country. The instance of setting fire to the house of the Home Minister in Kathmandu on December 10 had sent chills down the spines of the ruling classes and was a favorite topic of media coverage for several days. Armed propaganda actions in the form of marches, corner meetings, etc. have been organized regularly all over the country.
Apart from these military forms of actions, other non-military (or political, economic, social and cultural) actions have also been organized either in overt or covert manner in large numbers for mass mobilization or propaganda purposes. In this context the highly successful Kathmandu Valley Bandh (or general strike) on August 21 and Nepal Bandh on December 12 under the banner of a generated organization, National Mass Movement Coordination Committee, helped to mobilize the masses in hundreds of thousands in favor of the revolutionary politics. Similarly, various village development programs, people's cooperative schemes, etc. have been launched at the local level under the aegis of the United People's Front with a view to prepare grounds for the local power in the future. Different front organizations have been organizing open and legal activities to mobilize different classes and masses of the people. Particularly in urban areas new forms of organizations have sprung up to propagate revolutionary politics and expose the reactionary state.
During the Second Plan period the reactionary state has let loose its armed might against the revolutionary forces with greater vengeance. The instances of outright massacre and shooting have multiplied. So have the instances of police brutalities in the name of combing operations, etc. Villages have been set on fire, properties looted, women raped! The Western and Eastern regions have been the worst affected. More than a dozen persons have been shot by the police in one village, Mirul, along in Rolpa, including Com. Dev Gurung and a number of important leaders of the front organizations, thousands of people are arrested and kept behind bars in inhuman conditions. Leading national and international human rights organizations have decried the gross violations of human rights by the state.
The Politburo of the Party met in December and made preliminary evaluation of the implementation of the Second Plan. The progress was found quite satisfactory despite some limitations. The meeting formulated additional program to celebrate the first anniversary of the Initiation in a grand and fitting manner. The Second Plan is still in the process of implementation.
The qualitative leap in the social development process of Nepal marked by the historic initiation and continuation of the people's war has had important political implications in the country. The past one year of the people's war was accompanied by faster degeneration of the old reactionary forces and rising up of new revolutionary forces, thus hastening the process of socio-political polarization.
During this period the crisis of the old state was further aggravated and the contradictions within were seen more sharpened. As the problems of poverty, unemployment, price rise, corruption, foreign domination, etc. grew more acute and the state managed by a weak coalition of extreme rightist forces increasingly failed even to offer a patchwork solution, a situation of all-round instability, anarchy and total breakdown was created. Particularly there was a great patriotic surge among the masses against the abject surrender of the mainstream parliamentary parties, including the renegade UML clique, to Indian expansionism and the ratification of the Nepal-India "Mahakali River Integrated Development Project Treaty" by the puppet parliament. Later on a farcical attempt to bring about a new change in the coalition realignment of the government and the naked horse-trading of MPs, thoroughly exposed and discredited the parliamentary system as a whole. All this prompted even the BBC radio service to comment that "the ultimate winners and gainers in the national politics were the Maoists and the people's war."
The initiation of the people's war has hastened the process of polarization of the Nepalese Communist Movement as well. The attitude towards people's war has served as a good acid test to differentiate revolutionaries from the opportunists and revisionists. Whereas the renegade UML clique has further degenerated into reaction and attempted to endear both the king and the Indian expansionists to ride to power within the present dispensation to check the revolutionary process, a significant number of its leaders and cadres at different levels have crossed towards the revolutionary camp. Similarly two-line struggles have developed within the neo-revisionist Masal and right liquidationist "Unity Centre" over the question of support to the people's war. A large number of independent intellectuals and others have overtly or covertly extended their support to the people's war. Thus, at least politically if not organizationally, the CPN (Maoist) has emerged as the rallying center of all genuine communist revolutionaries in the country.
One year of people's war has had a very positive impact in the development of the three instruments of revolution, i.e. the Party, the Army and the United Front. The Party, long used to legal forms of struggle and organization, has had a marvelously quick and smooth transition into a fighting underground organization to lead the armed people's war. Except for isolated instances of revolutionary impetuosity or capitulationist tendency, there has been virtually no differences or inner struggle within the Party to implement the revolutionary line. Rather the people's war has significantly improved the ideological-political level, brought about unprecedented monolithic unity and given birth to a reliable hierarchy of revolutionary leadership from top to the bottom. Similarly on the question of the formation of the Army, the past one year has seen a meteoric rise, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Starting from the lowest and simplest formations speedier upgradations to higher levels and qualities of armed guerrilla formations have been achieved. Particularly the emphasis placed on militarization of the whole Party and development of symbiotic links with the masses has had a very important bearing on the rapid and qualitative development of the armed formations. And lastly, on the question of the development of the revolutionary United Front, the initiation of the people's war has prepared a material ground towards building such a Front under the leadership of the proletariat, and new initiatives have been taken in this regard during the past one year. Taking into account the historical experiences and specificities of Nepal, building of United Front has been attempted simultaneously at two levels. At the local level, where class struggle has developed to a significant height, clandestine United Front committees under the leadership of the Party have been formed to exercise embryonic local political power and sustain the people's war. At the central level, the already existing and high-profile United People's Front, Nepal, (established in 1991 as a loose front of different Left and democratic forces and since some time later on operating as an open forum of the Party till the initiation of the war) has been reorganized as embryonic revolutionary United Front by incorporating representatives from different progressive classes, oppressed nationalities and depressed regions primarily to carry out propaganda and agitations in favor of the New Democratic revolution. Enthusiastic responses to the people's war from different Organizations for the Liberation of Nationalities and from prominent individuals has brightened the prospects of building such a Front.
Experiences of one year of people's war have provided significant lessons both positive and negative, but mostly positive, which should prove valuable for the development of the war to higher levels in the future.
The pace and nature of development of the people's war in different phases from the initiation as a general "rebellion," through the continuation with a judicious blending of armed actions and mass mobilizations plus the open propaganda, to the Second Plan of "Development of Guerrilla Warfare in a Planned Manner"--has brought out some of the specificities of Nepal and has highlighted the need to be creative while applying the basic politico-military and organizational tenets of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. While the basic nature of the war would be protracted and the strategy would be that of encircling the city from the countryside, it seems that in the specific historical and geo-political case of Nepal the pace of development of the war could be faster and it would have to be waged, though in varying degrees, throughout the country or at least at several places at a time.
Valuable lessons have been learnt about the dialectical relationships between military and non-military forms of actions (though the former would be principal), between offensive and defensive actions, between centralization and decentralization of forces and activities, between open and clandestine activities, between people's war and mass movement, etc. Similarly, the Maoist formulation of decisiveness of "people" over "weapons" in the war has been experienced in practice, and the process of development of the people's war from the simple to the complex and from the lower to the higher levels has been observed in a significant scale. Also the strategic role and importance of guerrilla warfare in the overall military campaigns has been well understood and a number of basic tactics of guerrilla form of warfare has been practiced quite successfully. Some experiences have been gained in discerning and utilizing contradictions within the enemy camp.
The importance of constantly practicing mass line and devising ever newer forms of organization and struggle to mobilize the masses in favor of the armed struggle has been grasped from the beginning and effectively put into practice. Due attention has been paid to organize propaganda and publications and expand international relations in favor of the people's war, though further efforts and proficiency in this domain is desirable.
The all important role of the Party in leading the people's war and crucial significance of preservation of the leadership particularly in the initial phase of the war has been correctly grasped and inculcated among the cadres and the masses.
Apart from these, certain shortcomings and limitations have also been encountered, but quite naturally at that and not of any formidable nature or degree. The arrests of some responsible comrades and deaths of some others have occurred due to certain avoidable lapses mostly derived as a legacy from the past legalist work styles. Some erroneous thoughts about the relationship of people's war and mass movement, distinction between a national war and a civil war, the role of weapons in war, etc., have cropped up in between at some places but have been corrected subsequently.
In sum, the achievements of the past one year have been primary and the shortcomings are relative negligible. Building upon the foundation of this initial success and firmly grasping the invincible weapon of Marxism-Maoism-Leninism, the people' war in Nepal should scale greater heights in future and move towards and inevitable victory.
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