Dispatches: Report from the People's War in Nepal
Part 18: Starting and Sustaining People's War in Rukum
By Li Onesto
Revolutionary Worker #1036, December 26, 1999
On February 13, 1996, a new People's War was launched in Nepal, led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), aimed at sweeping away imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. Thousands of men and women participated in coordinated armed raids and attacks throughout the country. And for over three years now, the revolution in Nepal has continued to spread, sink roots and accomplish a lot. All this is a truly inspiring and significant development in the world and for the international proletariat. But it has remained a hidden story for most people in the United States and around the world. And for those of us who have been following the People's War in Nepal, there has been precious, but far too little news of this important struggle.
Now, the Revolutionary Worker has an exclusive story. RW reporter Li Onesto recently returned from several months in Nepal, where she traveled throughout the country with the people's army, meeting and talking with party leaders, guerrillas, activists in mass organizations and villagers--those waging this genuine Maoist People's War and beginning to exercise new people's power. The RW would like to give a "lal Salaam" (red salute) to all the people in Nepal who made this trip possible.
This is the eighteenth article of a new series of dispatches from this exciting trip. (See RW #1014-#1020, #1022-1024, #1027-1029 and #1032-1035 for Parts 1 through 17.)
One of the things that has really impressed me about the People's War in Nepal is how there is such a spirit of proletarian internationalism among all the comrades. Whether it's at a formal program, a small meeting with families of martyrs, or an interview with peasants or squad members--people always make a point of telling me how they see the People's War here as part of the worldwide revolutionary struggle.
The first time I heard the "Internationale"--the song sung by revolutionary communists around the world--in Nepalese, it sent shivers down my back. As a revolutionary in the United States, I had been singing and hearing this song in English and Spanish for many, many years. And I've heard it sung in several other languages as well. But this was my first time hearing the "Internationale" in Nepalese--in a guerrilla war zone, by comrades waging a genuine people's war. This was quite a moving experience. And I was determined to somehow capture some of this on tape, to be able to bring this back for people to listen to back home.
The comrades tell me that the District Secretary of Rukum, who I am meeting with here in this village, is a man of many talents. In addition to being a political leader, he also composes and sings revolutionary songs. When I hear about this, I immediately make a request. I ask him if he will let me make a tape recording of him singing the "Internationale."
So after our evening meal, the DS and his wife--who is also a good singer--put on a little performance for me. After singing several revolutionary songs to warm up they sing a beautiful version of the "Internationale" so I can tape it. Then, to my surprise, there is, in turn, another request. The DS pulls out his own tape recorder and asks if I will sing the "Internationale" in English, so he can record it.
Unlike the DS and his wife, I've never been known as a good singer (to say the least). So at first I panic at the thought of my slightly off-key rendition of the "Internationale" representing the comrades in the United States. But then I manage to swallow my individual pride. I muster up my proletarian internationalist spirit and sing...and it feels really good to make this connection. I know the comrades in the room can't understand the English words. But they immediately recognized the tune--and the revolutionary spirit.
*****
The next day I continue my discussions with the District Committee Secretary of Rukum and the Central Committee Comrade in charge of this zone.
After a year of intense preparation, armed struggle started around the country on February 13, 1996. The "DS" describes what happened in Rukum during this "First Plan" of the Initiation:
"The military action we were assigned was a raid on a police post, and it was successfully carried out on the day of initiation. The aim was to capture weapons, but there were no arms at this police post. The cadres captured the seven police and explained the political line behind the action to them. Official papers were seized. On the same day, the same detachment carried out a sabotage of a shop owned by a usurer, a man who exploited the people. This action was done under the party's regional leadership.
Within 15 days of the initiation, many military actions were carried out. There were 500 actions during this time. Most were sabotage actions aimed at usurers and liars--who cheat the people out of land and money--and spies.
"At the same time, the masses were involved in many different mass actions, like processions, cultural programs, meetings, etc. The party leadership and cadres were encouraged after the initiation. On the other hand, the enemy, the government, was confused about how to react.
"After 15 days, the government counterattacked very strongly. The government's Home Minister came to this district, stayed in the district headquarters, and gathered together with local officials and reactionaries to plan how to attack the People's War. They planned to kill many Maoists to try and stop the People's War. Six people were killed in one place, in Pipal VDC in Rukum, and there were all kinds of raids, arrests, rapes, etc.
"Only a few party cadres and leaders were underground before the initiation. Then with the initiation, 90 percent of party leaders and cadres went underground, and many sympathizers also went underground."
The CC Comrade talks about the achievements during the Initiation in this whole zone--which is a larger area than just the Rukum District. He says:
"There were three categories of work in the Initiation--guerrilla actions, propaganda and sabotage.
"On the first day of the initiation in this zone, there were two guerrilla actions--the raid on the Holeri police post in Rolpa and the raid on the Rari police post in Rukum. There were three main sabotages and other smaller sabotages and many propaganda actions. In the first 15 days, the total number of military actions in this zone was 1,800. The main slogan for these actions was : "Destroy the Monarchist Parliamentary System and Establish a New Democratic Republic of Nepal."
"Before the Initiation, actions against the enemy were classified into four types-- actions against: 1) the reactionary government; 2) feudal representatives; 3) comprador capitalists; and 4) imperialist institutions. In the Initiation the fighter groups targeted all four types of enemies."
"Develop Guerrilla Warfare"
The party's Second Strategic Plan was started eight months after the Initiation, in October of 1996. It was carried out under the slogan, "Develop guerrilla warfare in a planned manner so as to prepare the ground to convert specific areas into Guerrilla Zones."
The CC Comrade says: "In the Second Plan, more and more cadres came into the party. This was one achievement of the Second Plan. The party established that the main form of organization is military and the main form of struggle is war. Fighter groups were promoted to squads. In military terms there was quantitative and qualitative growth. The situation demanded the struggle to advance.
"The people accepted the People's War and became involved. The influence of liars and cheaters (who exploit the people) and usurers in the village decreased. Some of them moved away to the district headquarters or the capital, and those who stayed in the villages were not as active as before. During the Second Plan we started annihilations and raids, and ambushes continued."
The DS says: "At the time of the Initiation there were three types of military groups: 1) fighter teams; 2) village security teams; and 3) volunteer teams. The fighter teams carried out the raid on the police post and were the advanced team at the time. In the Second Plan squads were formed from the fighter teams. Fighter teams were then dissolved, but the other two types of military groups remained."
He then describes what effect the development of armed struggle had on the kinds of people that came forward to join the party:
"In the three years of People's War, the party's composition here has changed. By the Second Plan, most of the party cadre and leadership were men and women from poor, peasant backgrounds. There were less intellectuals and students. Now most people in the party here are young, 15 to 35 years old, with the majority 18 to 30 years old.
"Before the initiation, the membership of the party decreased through the rectification campaign. But in three years of People's War, party membership here--which includes the people's army--has doubled.
"The criteria for membership is stricter now than before the initiation. Before, the party mainly conducted legal struggle, and more people could be involved in this type of struggle, and it was easier. A lot of people who worked with the party became members and at the time the risks were not as great. But now is a time of war. The party is mainly involved in illegal activities and needs more dedicated cadres who are willing to sacrifice and keep strict secrecy. Today, the criteria for membership is higher in terms of ideological and political unity and willingness to make whatever physical sacrifices are necessary for the People's War and the party.
Building Military Strength
In August 1997, the party launched the Third Strategic Plan to "Develop Guerrilla Warfare to New Heights." This entailed raising the military ability of the revolutionary forces both qualitatively and quantitatively. An editorial in the party's journal, The Worker, explained that this means, "the creating of a base for local organs of political power and raising the political, organizational and technical level of the people's guerrilla army so as to be able to contend with the rival army in the prospective guerrilla zones."
The DS says: "By the start of the Third Strategic Plan, there were many squads, each with a minimum of five and a maximum of nine people in each. And there were about 60 to 65 village security teams and many volunteer teams.
"The squads have three types of weapons--knives, muzzle rifles and 12-bore rifles (basic, secondary and leading). Village security teams have knives and volunteer groups have domestic arms (knives, sickles, sticks, etc.).
The CC Comrade tells me that military actions increased during the Third Plan and he points to the significance of the boycott led by the party against the local elections. He says:
"In this zone there was a complete political vacuum in about a third of the VDCs (local political areas designated by the government)--where there were no VDC officials. In another third of the VDCs, there was a partial power vacuum.
"The important achievement of this period was the election boycott and the new thing that developed was this power vacuum. This was the result of the political movement and military actions. With this development the party introduced the plan to develop base areas."
The Fourth Strategic Plan started in October 1998 under the slogan, "Go forward to establish the base areas." During this period, the people's army in Rukum was able to achieve a higher level of military organization. While maintaining the squads, the party was able to develop the first platoon with about 24 members.
The DS explains: "In the platoon the leading (main) weapons are automatic or semi-automatic rifles, with a minimum of one for each platoon. The secondary weapons are 303 bolt action rifles. And the basic weapons are 12-bore rifles. In the squads, the main weapon is 303 bolt-action rifles, secondary is 12-bore rifles; and basic is muzzle rifles. Platoon Political Commissars and platoon commanders have revolvers or automatic pistols."
With the Fourth Strategic Plan, many more militias were formed in Rukum and the DS tells me this includes a number of all-women militias. The squads are about 30 percent women and there are some women who are vice commanders of squads. But at this point, there are not yet any women commanders.
The CC Comrade explains that in the Fourth Plan, four categories of areas have been established: 1) prospective base areas; 2) prospective guerrilla zones; 3) guerrilla action zones; and 4) propaganda zones. And there are now three types of military forces: 1) the main force, platoons; 2) the secondary force, squads; and 3) the basic force, militias and volunteer groups. He says:
"The platoons and squads are led directly by the party. The militias are led by the revolutionary united front. The platoons are under the regional bureau; squads are under district leadership.
"The platoons carry out guerrilla actions--primarily raids of police posts with the main aim to drive the enemy away and get weapons, and secondarily ambushes--setting mines and commando attacks. The squads mainly carry out ambushes and secondarily carry out minings, commando attacks and raids. The task of the militias is first of all sabotage and secondarily propaganda.
"All forces are allowed to carry out annihilations. Higher type of annihilations--like the killing of bureaucrats and political leaders--are done by platoons. Squads and militias target usurers and other lower level class enemies.
"All military forces have five functions: 1) political work (mass political education); 2) organization work (developing mass organizations) and 3) production and construction (growing food grains and solving people's problems; 4) Propaganda (putting slogans on walls, postering, and processions, including armed marches with torches; and 5) Fighting, military actions--which is the main function of the military organizations.
"The main force moves to and from the prospective base areas to the guerrilla action zone. The secondary force is also in the prospective base areas and can combine with the platoon for actions. There are also squads in the prospective guerrilla zones.
"Platoons cannot stay in the guerrilla action zone very long and there are only a few squads in this zone. The main force is very mobile while the squads are fixed in their areas (prospective base areas or prospective guerrilla zones).
"Squads and militias are in the propaganda zone--they centralize for actions, then decentralize. The main aim of these actions is to carry out attacks in the urban areas.
"In the prospective base areas our aim is to seize power and establish a permanent base area. Now our control in these areas is temporary--sometimes seized by the people, sometimes seized by the enemy.
"In the prospective guerrilla zones, the aim now is to establish temporary base areas. In the guerrilla action areas, the aim is to demoralize the enemy, extend the ground for warfare, and seize arms.
"In the propaganda zones, in the urban areas, the aim is to attack the enemy there and prepare the ground for eventual insurrection.
"The function of the Revolutionary United Front is to 1) seize and practice people's power in the (prospective) base areas; 2) seize and practice people's power and struggle in the guerrilla zones; and 3) carry out struggle in guerrilla action zones and propaganda zones.
"Since the Initiation, in three years in this zone, the main military actions have been: seven raids, 28 ambushes and minings. And there have been more than 50 annihilations--49 police have been killed.
"In short the achievements in three years are: 1) from the political point of view, local power has been seized and practiced by the people; 2) from the military point of view, three types of forces have been formed and there has been the beginning of mobile warfare; 3) from the cultural point of view, we are eliminating feudal culture and introducing a new revolutionary culture; and 4) from the economic point of view, we are carrying out collective and cooperative production, and volunteer production teams are helping martyr families and others who are not at home. Interest rates are fixed by people's power. There are fixed prices for goods. Many capitalist and imperialist institutions have been driven away. There is the start of cooperative financial funds. We are beginning to establish economic self sufficiency and we are carrying out production and construction--building paths, schools, playgrounds, martyr monuments and gates, bridges, public toilets, etc.
"In the last three years we have gone to the base class, the oppressed, and we have recruited many women into the different levels of supporting the people's war.
"There is one problem and that is: we have not been able to advance the military ability that is needed. In the prospective base area zones there are sufficient cadres but in the prospective guerrilla zones there are not enough so some cadres from the prospective base area have to be transferred to the prospective guerrilla zones. They go to temporarily to help build the work and then may return. But there is a lack of cadres quantitatively and qualitatively--in terms of leadership and military ability.
The DS adds: "We are clear on the political and ideological line in the party and among the masses. But one contradiction now is that the platoons are not as qualitatively developed as what is needed, in terms of military skills. And there is a big problem of not enough advanced weapons. We cannot fulfill the criteria we have set for the platoons and squads. If we have more weapons we can give more training and increase the number of platoons. And to establish a base area, we have to develop the military skills of the platoons and squads and provide arms according to our criteria."
"Within three years, we have learned that no one is born brave, but can become brave in practice. When we practice warfare we learn more lessons about war and it makes us mentally prepared to fight. Now, mentally we are prepared to fight, and we are ideologically and politically clear. But we have a crisis of arms--we don't have necessary weapons. We are advancing our skills for warfare. We have learned that even though we have inferior weapons, if we are mentally and ideologically and politically prepared, we can defeat the enemy. At the same time, in practice, we need sophisticated arms to get victory in the battlefield. So now we are concentrating on getting/capturing more sophisticated weapons.
To be continued.
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